diff --git a/helm-overrides/k8s-admin-prd-ase1/redis/custom-values.yaml b/helm-overrides/k8s-admin-prd-ase1/redis/custom-values.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a62f6ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/helm-overrides/k8s-admin-prd-ase1/redis/custom-values.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# Redis backing toolshed's managed cache add-on.
+#
+# Deployed as shared infrastructure in its own namespace rather than inside
+# the toolshed namespace, so it is addressed over cluster DNS like any other
+# platform component and its lifecycle is independent of the application
+# that happens to be its first consumer:
+#
+#   redis.redis.svc.cluster.local:6379
+#
+# The admin password comes from Vault through External Secrets — see
+# devops-infra-argo-config/secretstores/toolshed-redis-credentials.yaml. The
+# Secret must exist before this pod can start; a missing Secret leaves the
+# init container in CreateContainerConfigError rather than failing in a way
+# that explains itself.
+#
+# Read values.yaml's `config` block before changing anything about
+# authentication here. The absence of `requirepass` is deliberate and
+# security-relevant, not an oversight.
+
+fullnameOverride: redis
+
+image:
+  repository: redis
+  tag: "7-alpine"
+  pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+
+existingSecret: redis-credentials
+
+persistence:
+  enabled: true
+  storageClass: local-path
+  # Holds the ACL file and nothing else worth keeping — snapshotting is off
+  # (see config.save). 1Gi is already far more than needed; local-path
+  # cannot resize in place, so it is sized up front rather than tightly.
+  size: 1Gi
+
+config:
+  # The node has 8GB and was at its ceiling before Postgres was added; the
+  # demo apps were scaled to zero to make room for that. 48mb is a real
+  # cache for a handful of small internal tools and costs little.
+  maxmemory: 48mb
+  maxmemoryPolicy: allkeys-lru
+  save: ""
+
+resources:
+  requests:
+    cpu: 25m
+    memory: 32Mi
+  limits:
+    memory: 96Mi
diff --git a/helm-templates/redis/Chart.yaml b/helm-templates/redis/Chart.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..862f67e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/helm-templates/redis/Chart.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+apiVersion: v2
+name: redis
+description: |
+  Single-instance Redis for this homelab, backing toolshed's managed cache
+  add-on (internal/dbprovision) — toolshed provisions a per-app ACL user
+  scoped to its own key prefix on request.
+
+  Hand-written rather than vendoring Bitnami's chart, for the same reason
+  the sibling postgresql chart is: Broadcom has been retiring and freezing
+  images behind that repo (claude.md infra issue #4, where it broke Contour
+  twice), and Redis publishes no official Helm chart of its own.
+
+  Authentication is defined entirely by the ACL file, with no requirepass.
+  That is not a style choice — see values.yaml, where the reasoning is
+  recorded alongside the setting it explains. Getting it wrong leaves the
+  server open to unauthenticated access after its first restart.
+
+  Not highly available and not intended to be. One replica, one PVC, no
+  replication, no sentinel. On a single-node cluster those would be
+  theatre.
+type: application
+version: 0.1.0
+appVersion: "7"
diff --git a/helm-templates/redis/templates/service.yaml b/helm-templates/redis/templates/service.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f234ede
--- /dev/null
+++ b/helm-templates/redis/templates/service.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{{- $name := .Values.fullnameOverride | default "redis" -}}
+# ClusterIP only. Nothing outside the cluster should reach Redis, and there
+# is no Ingress here on purpose — Contour terminates HTTP, and exposing
+# Redis's wire protocol through it is neither possible nor wanted.
+#
+# Consumers address this as:
+#   {{ $name }}.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local:{{ .Values.service.port }}
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: {{ $name }}
+  namespace: {{ .Release.Namespace }}
+  labels:
+    app: {{ $name }}
+spec:
+  type: ClusterIP
+  selector:
+    app: {{ $name }}
+  ports:
+    - name: redis
+      port: {{ .Values.service.port }}
+      targetPort: redis
+      protocol: TCP
diff --git a/helm-templates/redis/templates/statefulset.yaml b/helm-templates/redis/templates/statefulset.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d568768
--- /dev/null
+++ b/helm-templates/redis/templates/statefulset.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+{{- $name := .Values.fullnameOverride | default "redis" -}}
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: StatefulSet
+metadata:
+  name: {{ $name }}
+  namespace: {{ .Release.Namespace }}
+  labels:
+    app: {{ $name }}
+spec:
+  serviceName: {{ $name }}
+  replicas: 1
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ $name }}
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: {{ $name }}
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        # The official image runs as the redis user (uid 999 on the Alpine
+        # variant). fsGroup makes the provisioned volume group-writable so
+        # Redis can write the ACL file it is given — without it ACL SAVE
+        # fails at provisioning time with a permission error.
+        fsGroup: 999
+      terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 30
+      initContainers:
+        # Seeds the ACL file with the default (admin) user on first boot
+        # only. Redis will not start with an --aclfile that does not exist,
+        # and the default user has to be defined there rather than by
+        # requirepass — see the long note in values.yaml for why that
+        # distinction is a security property and not a preference.
+        #
+        # Never overwrites an existing file. That file is rewritten by ACL
+        # SAVE every time toolshed provisions an app user, so recreating it
+        # on every pod start would silently delete every provisioned user
+        # and lock those apps out — the exact failure this whole design
+        # exists to prevent, reintroduced from the other end.
+        #
+        # Consequence worth knowing: rotating the admin password in Vault
+        # does NOT propagate here, because this only ever runs against a
+        # missing file. Rotating means `ACL SETUSER default >newpassword`
+        # followed by `ACL SAVE` against the running server.
+        - name: seed-acl
+          image: "{{ .Values.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.image.tag }}"
+          imagePullPolicy: {{ .Values.image.pullPolicy }}
+          env:
+            - name: REDIS_PASSWORD
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: {{ .Values.existingSecret }}
+                  key: {{ .Values.secretKeys.password }}
+          command:
+            - sh
+            - -c
+            - |
+              set -e
+              if [ -f /data/users.acl ]; then
+                echo "ACL file already present; leaving it alone."
+                exit 0
+              fi
+              echo "user default on >$REDIS_PASSWORD ~* &* +@all" > /data/users.acl
+              chmod 600 /data/users.acl
+              echo "Seeded ACL file with the default user."
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /data
+      containers:
+        - name: redis
+          image: "{{ .Values.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.image.tag }}"
+          imagePullPolicy: {{ .Values.image.pullPolicy }}
+          args:
+            - redis-server
+            - --aclfile
+            - /data/users.acl
+            - --maxmemory
+            - {{ .Values.config.maxmemory | quote }}
+            - --maxmemory-policy
+            - {{ .Values.config.maxmemoryPolicy | quote }}
+            - --save
+            - {{ .Values.config.save | quote }}
+          ports:
+            - name: redis
+              containerPort: 6379
+              protocol: TCP
+          # Authenticated probes: with the ACL file in place an
+          # unauthenticated PING is correctly refused with NOAUTH, so a
+          # bare `redis-cli ping` would mark a perfectly healthy server as
+          # failing. Run through a shell so the environment expands —
+          # Kubernetes does not substitute $(VAR) inside exec probe
+          # commands.
+          env:
+            - name: REDIS_PASSWORD
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: {{ .Values.existingSecret }}
+                  key: {{ .Values.secretKeys.password }}
+          readinessProbe:
+            exec:
+              command: ["sh", "-c", 'redis-cli --no-auth-warning -a "$REDIS_PASSWORD" ping | grep -q PONG']
+            initialDelaySeconds: 5
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+            failureThreshold: 6
+          livenessProbe:
+            exec:
+              command: ["sh", "-c", 'redis-cli --no-auth-warning -a "$REDIS_PASSWORD" ping | grep -q PONG']
+            initialDelaySeconds: 20
+            periodSeconds: 20
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+            failureThreshold: 6
+          resources:
+            {{- toYaml .Values.resources | nindent 12 }}
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /data
+{{- if .Values.persistence.enabled }}
+  volumeClaimTemplates:
+    - metadata:
+        name: data
+      spec:
+        accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
+        storageClassName: {{ .Values.persistence.storageClass | quote }}
+        resources:
+          requests:
+            storage: {{ .Values.persistence.size | quote }}
+{{- end }}
diff --git a/helm-templates/redis/values.yaml b/helm-templates/redis/values.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb8e26f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/helm-templates/redis/values.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# Chart defaults. Real configuration lives in
+# helm-overrides/k8s-admin-prd-ase1/redis/custom-values.yaml.
+
+fullnameOverride: redis
+
+image:
+  # Pulled from Docker Hub, like every other infra component here (gitea,
+  # vault, harbor, postgresql). The base-images mirror in Harbor exists to
+  # remove Docker Hub from the *application build* path — it is not in play
+  # for platform components.
+  repository: redis
+  tag: "7-alpine"
+  pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+
+# Name of the Secret holding the admin password. Created by External
+# Secrets from Vault, not by this chart — a chart that generates its own
+# password regenerates it on every render, which would rewrite the ACL file
+# and lock every already-provisioned app out of its own data.
+existingSecret: redis-credentials
+secretKeys:
+  password: password
+
+service:
+  port: 6379
+
+persistence:
+  enabled: true
+  # local-path-provisioner, this cluster's default StorageClass. Small: this
+  # holds the ACL file and (if enabled) an RDB snapshot, not a dataset of
+  # any size — maxmemory below is the real ceiling on what Redis will hold.
+  # The volume is not resizable in place with this provisioner, so it is
+  # sized up front.
+  storageClass: local-path
+  size: 1Gi
+
+config:
+  # ACL FILE, NOT requirepass. This distinction is load-bearing and easy to
+  # "simplify" into a security hole, so it is written down here rather than
+  # left to be rediscovered:
+  #
+  # toolshed provisions per-app users with ACL SETUSER, and persists them
+  # with ACL SAVE (internal/dbprovision.EnsureRedisUser) — without that
+  # save, every provisioned user is lost on the next restart and every app
+  # using Redis fails to authenticate with credentials that still look
+  # valid. ACL SAVE requires an aclfile; that is why one is configured.
+  #
+  # But ACL SAVE also writes the *default* user's state to that file. With
+  # `requirepass` set and the default user defined only by it, the saved
+  # entry comes back as `user default on nopass ~* &* +@all` — and after
+  # the next restart the ACL file wins, leaving Redis accepting
+  # UNAUTHENTICATED connections with full access. Verified directly, not
+  # inferred: with requirepass the restarted server answered an
+  # unauthenticated PING with PONG and served a key.
+  #
+  # Defining the default user in the ACL file instead (seeded by the init
+  # container, see the StatefulSet) keeps its password across every
+  # subsequent ACL SAVE — the same restart then correctly answers
+  # `NOAUTH Authentication required.`
+  #
+  # If you ever add `requirepass` here, you reintroduce that hole.
+  maxmemory: 48mb
+  # allkeys-lru, because this backs a connection kind literally called
+  # "cache" and eviction under pressure is that contract. An app using
+  # Redis as its only copy of something wants noeviction instead — at
+  # which case writes start failing when full rather than data silently
+  # disappearing. Neither is safe for every use; this one matches the name.
+  maxmemoryPolicy: allkeys-lru
+  # Snapshotting off. What must survive a restart is the ACL file, which is
+  # written by ACL SAVE independently of RDB/AOF. Cached values are by
+  # definition reconstructible, and on a node at its memory ceiling a
+  # background save's copy-on-write spike is a real risk for no benefit.
+  save: ""
+
+# Tuned for a node with 8GB total that is already near its ceiling. The
+# request is what the scheduler reserves; the limit is sized above
+# maxmemory so Redis hits its own eviction policy rather than being
+# OOM-killed by the kernel, which loses the whole instance instead of the
+# coldest keys.
+resources:
+  requests:
+    cpu: 25m
+    memory: 32Mi
+  limits:
+    memory: 96Mi