Environment variables are delivered through a Secret so values never appear
in the pod spec, but the ClusterRole was never given the resource — so every
deploy with configuration failed on a forbidden error, minutes after the
change looked fine.
Granted without list or watch. Kubernetes RBAC cannot scope a ClusterRole to
a namespace pattern, so this necessarily covers every namespace; withholding
list at least stops deployer enumerating the cluster's secrets, leaving only
access by a name it already knows. That narrows the blast radius rather than
removing it, and is called out in the manifest.
The proper fix, once there are tenants who are not the operator, is a
RoleBinding created per app namespace. That requires deployer to be able to
create RoleBindings, which is its own escalation path and wants deciding
deliberately rather than being slipped in here.
Scoped to the resource kinds toolshed creates for an app — not
cluster-admin, not a wildcard. This is the one credential in the system
whose compromise means the cluster, so what it can do should fit on one
screen.
Here rather than in toolshed's chart because these are cluster-scoped and
that Application runs in the webapp project, which permits only Namespace.
Widening webapp would have given every demo app in it the ability to create
cluster-wide RBAC.
Mukul Sharma